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1. Introductory Remarks on the Historical Background 
of Austrian Federalism
After the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, 
the Länder played an important role in building up the new Republic 
of Austria. Historically, the Länder have come into existence during 
the Middle Ages and have later been the constituting entities of the 
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Habsburg empire. Despite the fact that the Länder lost political weight 
during the long going debates on the new constitution while the 
central government in Vienna, which was at the beginning of the new 
republic weak and powerless, got steadily stronger the Austrian con-
stitution of 1920 formed the new state as a federation. The federal 
system was supposed to prevent tendencies of separation and bring 
more balance into the political system by reducing the political weight 
of the capital, the ‘red” Vienna. The constitution, however, was a 
compromise formula between the Social democrats, who supported 
a strong centralistic state and the Christian social party who preferred 
a federal system similar to Switzerland.
The Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz = 
B-VG) was mostly drawn up by the famous Austrian jurisprudent Hans 
Kelsen und was inspired by the sprit of legal positivism. It created a 
federation with strong unitary elements and a clear overweight of 
the federal level of government towards the Länder.
2. Institutions and Structures of Austrian Federalism
2.1. General remarks
Art. 2 of the Federal Constitution of 1920 (Bundes-Verfassungs-
gesetz = B-VG) explicitly stipulates that Austria is a federal state which 
consists of nine autonomous Länder, namely Burgenland, Carinthia, 
Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg and 
Vienna. Federalism is considered to be one of the basic principles of 
the Austrian Federal Constitution (other basic principles are the prin-
ciple of rule of law, the democratic principle and the republican princi-
ple). According to Art. 44 par 3 of the Federal Constitution, a total 
revision of the constitution needs to be approved by referendum. 
Legal theory and jurisdiction hold that a ‘total revision’ does not only 
occur if the constitution as a whole is changed but also if one of the 
basic principles is deleted or considerably modified. Consequently the 
abolishment of the federal principle requires the consent of the peo-
ple in a referendum in addition to a two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
According to the jurisdiction of the federal Constitutional Court the 
federal principle has three substantive elements:
– distribution of legislative and administrative competencies;
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– participation of the Länder in federal legislation and adminis-
tration (called ‘indirect federal administration’, mainly executed by 
the state governor);
– constitutional autonomy of the Länder.
The treaty of Austria’s accession to the EU was qualified as a 
total revision of the Austrian Federal Constitution which needed to 
be approved by referendum in accordance with Art. 44 par 3 B-VG. 
According to Art. 44 par 2 B-VG modifications of the Federal Constitu-
tion which reduce the competencies of the Länder also need the con-
sent of the Federal Council (Bundesrat).
The original concept of the Federal Constitution, mostly drawn 
up by the famous jurisprudent Hans Kelsen in 1920, created Austria 
as a highly centralized federation. Many of the amendments since 
1920 modified the division of competencies and transferred addi-
tional powers to the federal level. In the main legislative realms as 
well as in the administration of laws the Federation plays a pivotal 
role. For example the courts are regulated by federal law and judges 
and other employees are civil servants of the Federation. Furthermore, 
matters of internal security are legislated and administered at the 
federal level.
Austrian federalism is designed in a strictly symmetrical fashion: 
The nine Länder have equal rights concerning their legislative com-
petencies and their constitutional autonomy. The only exceptions can 
be found with regard to Vienna, the capital, which is both a Land as 
well as a municipality.
2.2. Institutional Set-up on the Level of the Länder
The Federal Constitution basically determines the election, com-
position and role of the Land parliaments (‘Landtage’), but leaves it 
to the Land Constitutions to regulate them more precisely.1 Resulting 
from their autonomous sphere of competencies, the nine Länder 
1. Anna Gamper, Legislative und Executive Federalism in Austria, Vienna, Braumüller Ver-
lag, 2004, p. 16.
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have their own legal systems although they are strictly limited by the 
powers of the federal government. However, apart from some restric-
tions in the Federal Constitution, the Länder enjoy constitutional 
autonomy.
There is no bicameral system at the Länder level. The election 
of the Landtage is based on the same electoral principles as the elec-
tion of the National Council (Art. 95 B-VG), namely the principle of 
proportionality. The Landtage are responsible for law-making in the 
Länder.
Each Land Constitution contains more detailed supplementary 
provisions for the selection and composition of the Land legislature 
which have to conform to the Federal Constitution.
Beginning in the 1980s, after a long standstill since 1920, various 
institutional reforms of the constitutions of the Länder were imple-
mented, bringing about more elements of direct democracy, introduc-
ing aims and goals of state activities and enlarging the range of in-
struments such as public auditing in the constitutions.
Some observers have stated a ‘wider self-consciousness’ of the 
Länder to use their constitutional autonomy. This movement started 
in 1984 by the reform of the Land constitution of Vorarlberg which 
also played a leading role during the reform debates within the 
‘structural reform of competencies” in den 1990s. Other Länder, such 
as Tyrol, Salzburg and Upper Austria followed with similar modifica-
tions of their Land constitutions. Like Vorarlberg in 1923, Salzburg 
und Tyrol have changed their constitutions in 1998 in order to ac-
commodate the election of their state governments by a majority 
vote system rather than by proportional representation. These reforms 
were meant to spur political competition, however, it remains debat-
able whether this goal was actually achieved. This might be the rea-
son why the other Länder stick to their system of proportional rep-
resentation.
2.3. Role of Municipalities
Municipalities are playing an important role in the Austrian con-
stitutional system. There are about 2350 municipalities, most of them 
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with not more than 10.000 inhabitants. According to the general clause 
of Art 118 B-VG, the municipalities have their own field of action for 
all matters which exclusively or predominantly deal with interests of 
the local community and are suited for management by the commu-
nity within its local borders (for example: local public security police, 
administration of municipal traffic areas and local traffic police). All 
in all there are three levels of government in Austria, hence one could 
speak of a “three-level-feder alism”.2
3. Reforming Debates in the Past
In the past, various commissions have failed to reform and mod-
ernise the Austrian federal system. The main reasons for their failure 
have been the anti-federal attitude of the bureaucratic staff in the 
ministries and the Länder’s lack of interest to obtain new competen-
cies and responsibilities which might bear political conflict.3
Two crucial reform projects of the last years should be mentioned:
3.1. “Structural Reform of Competencies” 1989 – 1994
At the end of the 1980s, faced with the possibility of Austria’s 
accession to the EU, the Länder called for a fundamental redistribu-
tion of competencies within the federal system in order to compensate 
for their loss of powers and influence in various legislative realms 
(‘Structural Reform of the Distribution of Competencies’). A political 
pact (‘Political Agreement on the Reorganisation of the Federation’) 
was signed in 1992 by the Federal Chancellor (on behalf of the Fed-
eral Government) and by the chairman of the Conference of Land 
Governors (on behalf of the Länder). It contained an agreement about 
the timing of a constitutional reform which stipulated that a govern-
ment bill was to be drafted before the date of the referendum on EU 
membership so that it could be enacted no later than the constitu-
2. See also Peter Bußjäger, “Local government cooperation in Austria: Options and bene-
fits for the communities”, in: de Villiers (ed.), Crossing the Line: Dealing with Cross-Border 
Communities, Johannesburg, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2009, pp. 81-91.
3. See also Peter Bußjäger, “Experts tackle the Constitution”, Federations June/July 2007, 
pp. 30-31.
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tional amendment concerning Austria’s EU accession. However, though 
a bill entitled ‘Structural Reform of the Federation’ was indeed draft-
ed, it proved impossible for the national parliament to enact it. For 
at the 1994 general election, the incumbent SPÖ/ÖVP grand coalition 
lost the necessary two-thirds majority in the National Council (‘Na-
tionalrat’, first chamber of the national parliament) and the Länder 
in the end rejected the compromise formula which the government 
was obliged to negotiate with the opposition on whose support the 
bill now depended.4 The Länder were especially opposed against the 
compromise concerning the introduction of administrative courts of 
the Länder. The executives of the Länder feared the costs of the new 
courts and the loss of political power.
3.2. Austrian Convention 2003 – 2005
The next project of a structural reform of the Austrian federal 
system was the Austrian Convention from June 2003 to January 2005. 
While the initiative for the ‘Structural reform of competencies’ in the 
early 1990s was caused by Austria’s forthcoming accession to the 
European Union, the Austrian Convention was an apparent result of 
Austria’s EU membership. Ten working groups were formed which 
discussed different aspects of the reform agenda.
The Convention’s task was to submit proposals for reforming 
the Austrian political system and constitution. With the future con-
stitution, Austria was supposed to be able to fulfil its tasks in a 
cost-effective, transparent and citizen-friendly way. Especially the 
division of competencies between the federal and state levels was 
to be made compatible with the European Union. The convention 
finished its work in January 2005 without reaching consent in the 
most intensively debated matters. These concerned the division of 
competencies, the restructuring of the financial relationships be-
tween federal level, Länder and local governments as well as the 
creation of a new charter of fundamental rights including social 
guarantees.5
4. See also Bußjäger, Experts, 2007, p. 31.
5. See also Bußjäger, Experts, 2007, p. 31.
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Although both reform projects had similar goals, there is one 
important difference: during the late 1990s and the first years of the 
21st century the paradigms of the Austrian discussion about the fed-
eral system changed. Reform discussions no longer dealt with the 
strengthening of the powers of the Länder but with the future of 
the federal system itself. However, this change of paradigms has not 
yet brought about any legal consequences.
3.3. Expert Group on Reforming State and Administration 
2007 – 2008
After the elections of Oct 1 2006 Austria’s new chancellor, Alfred 
Gusenbauer, a Social Democrat, had declared reform of the Austrian 
federal state and of the administration as “the heart” of the govern-
ing agreement between the two parties in his coalition Government. 
Gusenbauer was sworn in as chancellor in January 2007, after more 
than three months of difficult negotiations between his party and the 
conservative People’s Party that ended in a coalition agreement.
The national elections had led to a near tie in the number of 
legislative seats held by the Social Democrats and the People’s Party. 
The choice of federal reform was hailed as a breakthrough, because 
the conservative People’s Party had traditionally favoured a high de-
gree autonomy of the Länder, the equivalent of states or provinces, 
while the Social Democrats had in the past argued for a strong central 
government.
In fact, the section of the agreement dealing with the new con-
stitutional reform did not aim to write a new constitution, but rather 
seemed to achieve other reforms such as:
– establishing administrative courts in the Länder which would 
allow participation of the Länder in courts.
– organizing a new system of administration for education, which 
could enable the Länder to play a more important role in Austria’s 
educational system.
– enhancing the constitutional autonomy of the Länder and re-
ducing the supervising powers of the federation.
Peter Bußjäger
18
REAF, núm. 10, abril 2010, p. 11-39
– creating a new distribution of competencies by a so-called 
“third pillar,” which would allow a certain form of cooperative legis-
lation between the federation and the Länder.
This last goal, the creation of a “third pillar,” turned out to be the 
most difficult. Many observers doubted from the beginning whether there 
would be any chance of reaching consensus on a new form of power 
sharing since the Austrian Convention had failed in the same project.
One essential difference with the new constitutional reform under 
Chancellor Gusenbauer was that the reform proposals had to be fleshed 
out by a small group of experts who played an important role in the past 
attempt at reforming Austria’s federal system. The agreement between 
the Social Democrats and the People’s Party named two experts for each 
of the parties in the coalition. The experts from the Social Democrats were 
Theo Öhlinger, professor of constitutional law at the University of Vi-
enna, and Peter Kostelka, former speaker of the Social Democratic party 
caucus in the Austrian legislature, later named Ombudsman by his party.
The experts from the People’s Party were Andreas Khol, former 
President of the Austrian legislature, now retired but still one of the 
most prominent political experts on Austrian federalism, and Franz 
Fiedler, former President of the Austrian court of audit.
Two experts were delegated by the conference of the state gov-
ernors. The first was Gabriele Burgstaller, Land governor of Salzburg 
and a member of the Social Democrats; the second is Herbert Saus-
gruber, Land governor of Vorarlberg, from the People’s Party. These 
two individuals were partly represented by other experts. Georg Lien-
bacher, head of the Constitutional Service of the Federal Chancellery, 
acted as Secretary General of the group. The group of experts had 
until the end of June 2007 to work out its proposals.
First the expert group focused its energies on issues related to 
administrative courts in the Länder, the organization of the educa-
tional administration in Austria and concentrating the administration 
of social welfare in a one-stop-shop on the regional level. In a second 
step, in spring 2008, proposals were presented on the division of com-
petencies and the legal status of the Federal Council. Concerning the 
latter point not even the expert group could reach consent about 
the new role of the second chamber of Austrian parliament.
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3.4. Reforming State and Administration in the Government 
Program of the coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP 2008
Reforming state and administration is still on the agenda of 
the present Federal Government. The main goal is strengthening 
efficiency of state and administration. Some contents are well-known 
from former projects:
Administrative courts in the Länder are once again on the 
agenda. Another part is strengthening the constitutional autonomy 
of the Länder for example by reducing intervening rights of the 
Federal Government against laws passed by the Landtage.
On the municipal level the Government intends to improve 
the autonomy of the municipalities and to facilitate inter-municipal 
cooperation.
The present Federal Government however sets, probably as a 
result of all failed reform projects of the past, the focus of its reform 
project not in a fundamental reform of the federal system but in 
bringing more efficiency in administrative procedures and in improv-
ing cooperation between all levels of state.
Once again a working group is established, consisting of 
experts of two scientific institutes on economics (WIFO and IHS) 
and the Austrian court of Auditing and representatives of the 
Federal Government and the Länder. The task of the working 
group is to elaborate proposals of administrative reforms in Aus-
tria. Expectations of observers are fairly small: The failure of many 
reform projects of the past is a heavy burden for the ongoing dis-
cussions.
4. Problems and Challenges of Austrian Federalism
4.1. Europeanization and Federalism
Membership to the EU means a challenge for any political system 
with decentralized legislation on regional level. Not only that Euro-
pean legislation also affects legislative competences on regional level 
or that European legislation has to be carried out on regional level, 
Peter Bußjäger
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it is also difficult for regional jurisdictions to participate in the decision 
making process on European level.
According to Art 23 par 5 B-VG, the Länder are bound to imple-
ment legislation of the European Union provided that it falls into their 
sphere of competence. Should a Land fail to comply with this obliga-
tion and should this be confirmed by a court within the framework 
of the European Union the legislative competence is transferred to 
the federal level. The law or ordinance that has been issued by the 
federal level becomes invalid as soon as the Land takes action to ful-
fil its responsibilities.
Today about 20–30 percent of the legislation of the Länder is at 
least partly dealing with EU law, namely the implementation of di-
rectives.6 Analyses of federal legislation are showing similar results.
Due to the Europeanization of the legislative competencies the 
parliaments of the Länder are faced with obligations of implementing 
European directives and restrictions resulting from the Treaties. In fact 
the Landtage have lost competencies and autonomy. Nearly all legis-
lative competencies of the Länder are in some way affected by EU 
law. The most prominent matters of regional politics which are ‘Europ-
eanized’ are agriculture, regulations of the Länder concerning acqui-
sition of real estates, nature and landscape protection, town and 
country planning, energy, working law of civil servants of the Länder 
and local governments.7
Administrative competencies of the Länder are affected by direct 
administration of EU law, which means the execution of EU regula-
tions or direct application of provisions of the treaties. With some 
exceptions direct application of EU directives concerns comparatively 
few matters (agriculture and administration of structural funds). In 
other realms, direct application of EU law plays no significant role.
The EU rules of competition have had an important impact on 
regional politics with regard to the funding of economic projects and 
6. See nearer Peter Bußjäger/Daniela Larch, Europäisierungsgrad und Landesgesetzgebung, 
Innsbruck, Institut für Föderalismus, 2004.
7. Bußjäger/Larch, Europäisierungsgrad und Landesgesetzgebung, 2004, pp. 9-11.
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the EU contracting law for public mandates. These had to be imple-
mented into Austrian law when Austria joined the EU.
In several cases Europeanization has led to a centralisation of 
powers at the federal level: in the case of animal protection the fact 
that the Länder had to implement numerous directives into their legal 
systems motivated the federal government in 2004 to introduce a bill 
which transferred these competencies to the federal level. In 2002, the 
federation has gained competencies with regard to public procurement 
law for similar reasons. Furthermore, the Länder lost legislative com-
petencies in the field of energy (mainly electricity and power plants). 
The Länder, however, made no objections against these centralisations.
As a countermove the executives of the Länder have to a certain 
extent won political influence vis-à-vis the federal government by 
being able to pass binding comments (see below).
With regard to legislation, nearly all fields of public policies of 
the Länder have been affected by Europeanization. In the realm of 
environmental and social politics Europeanization has had an extensive 
impact: numerous directives concerning country planning (such as the 
so-called SEA directive)8 have had to be implemented into the Länder’s 
legal systems. Furthermore, Europeanization affects social politics with 
regard to non-discrimination.
Until now there are – apart from the provisions of participation 
of the Länder in the European decision-making process (see below) 
– no specific provisions on subsidiary control mechanisms (according 
to the protocol on subsidiary and proportionality in the annex of the 
European Constitutional Treaty). However, the Austrian Landtage are 
demanding institutionalisation of such procedures in order to define 
the relationship between federal and state parliaments.
Since it became clear that, with Austria’s accession to the EU, a 
number of competencies which were still in the realm of the Länder 
would either be transferred to the EU level or ‘Europeanized’, the 
Länder demanded not only a structural reform of the competencies 
but also participation in the decision-making process at the EU level.
8. Directive 2001/42/EC.
Peter Bußjäger
22
REAF, núm. 10, abril 2010, p. 11-39
Since Austria’s accession to the EU needed to be ratified in a 
referendum and the federal government needed the support of the 
political elites in the Länder in order to promote the campaign for 
the referendum, the Länder were successful in obtaining a role in the 
decision-making process of the EU. As a result Art. 23d B-VG stipulates 
that the federal government must inform the Länder without delay 
about all projects within the framework of the European Union which 
either affect the Länder’s autonomous sphere of competences or could 
otherwise be of interest to them. In addition, the federal government 
must grant the Länder the chance to comment on EU decision-making 
within a reasonable timeframe.
In case the federal government receives an unanimous statement 
by the Länder regarding matters within the sphere of Länder compe-
tencies, it is bound to adhere to this statement in negotiations at the 
European level. It may only deviate from this due to compelling foreign 
and integration policy reasons and has to inform the Länder about 
the reasons for its deviation without delay.
In practice, from 1993 until the end of 2008 (the first statements 
were already submitted during the negotiations between the EU and 
Austria) the Austrian Länder submitted 75 unanimous statements.9 
The federal government only deviated in a few cases which were of 
no significant importance to the Länder.10
It seems that the interests of the federal and the regional level 
in Austria have so far been relatively close to one another. However, 
it should be mentioned that the statements of the Länder are in some 
cases very vague and imprecise, consequently imposing only few re-
strictions on the federal government in the negotiations at the Euro-
pean level. The uniform statements of the Länder are formulated in 
a cooperative way. It rarely happens that such statements fail on 
ground of objections of one or more other Länder. This indicates broad 
common interests of the Länder.
9. Source: Institute of Federalism, Innsbruck
10. See Andreas Rosner, “Drei Rechtsfragen der Mitwirkung der Länder in Angelegenhei-
ten der europäischen Integration”, in: Bußjäger/Rosner, Mitwirken und Mitgestalten – 
Europa und die österreichischen Länder, Wien, Braumüller Verlag, 2005, pp. 62-67.
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The Länder can also participate directly in EU negotiations. If 
issues within their legislative realm are discussed, the government 
may include a Länder nominee in the Austrian delegation. This rep-
Table 1. Unanimous statements of the Austrian Länder on projects within the frame-
work of the European Union concerning the types of projects from 1993–2008
Types of projects Number
Proposals of directives of the EU 31
Comments on administration and implementation of EU law 11
Comments on planned decisions or measures to be taken of the EU 15
Negotiations on Austria’s accession to the EU 3
Negotiations on enlargement of the EU 3
Other projects of the Commission (‘green books’, ‘white books’…) 3
Proposals of regulations of the EU 4
Austrian position to conferences of the governments of the EU 2
Procedures before the Court 2
Treaties with the EU 1
Total 75
Table 2. Unanimous statements of the Länder on projects within the framework of 
the EU concerning fields of regional politics
Agendas Number
Environment/waste disposal 17
Nature protection 19
Economics, fundings, social services of general interest 9
Animal protection 5
Town- and Country-planning 5
Freedom of residence 4
Acquisition of real estates 3
Fundamental positions (e.g. on conferences of the governments of the EU) 3
Technical regulations (e.g. on fields of building law) 2
Culture 2
Social politics 4
Sports 1
Tourism 1
Total 75
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resentative may, however, only act in cooperation with the responsi-
ble member of the government (see Art. 23d par 3 B-VG).
In practice, the participation of a so-called common representa-
tive of the Länder in the Council has no relevance. The participation 
of representatives of the Länder in the Austrian delegation within 
working groups of the Council is much more important.
It needs to be mentioned that the statements of the Länder 
regarding EU matters are in most cases elaborated within the gov-
ernments and without any participation of the state parliaments. 
We can therefore state that Europeanization in Austria has led to a 
strengthening of the position of the state governor vis-à-vis the fed-
eral government und has weakened the position of the state legis-
latures. The latter have to implement European law into the state 
legal system without participating in the European decision-making 
process in the same way as the state governments. Although the 
Landtage have established committees for European matters they 
have not been able to gain much influence with regard to European 
legislation. This is even the case in states in which the state govern-
ment is obliged to inform the Landtag about projects of European 
integration (Burgenland, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg).
It is also important to note that until today there are no institu-
tional and only few informal connections to the Federal Council in 
European matters. The reason is that the Federal Council, contrary to 
the National Council, disposes of no effective instrument to submit 
binding comments to the federal government. The Federal Council is 
allowed to formulate binding comments only if EU law must be 
implement ed by a modification of the Federal Constitution which would 
reduce the competencies of the Länder in legislation or execution.
Another aspect is the question of application and implementa-
tion of EU law in the Länder. As EU law normally relates to the spheres 
of competences of both the national level and the regions, problems 
of application and implementation of supranational law are usually 
greater for federal states, because in these systems the legislative 
competencies are divided between the level of the federal govern-
ment or the state on the one hand and the sub-national units on the 
other hand.
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Given the size of the country, which is smaller than the German 
state Bavaria, this procedure is considered to be rather expensive and 
complicated. Additionally, sceptics blamed the federal system for Aus-
tria’s mediocre implementation results. However, several analyses by 
the Institute of Federalism have shown that in most cases it was the 
federal government and not the Länder which caused the delay. The 
same result occurred with regard to judgements of the European Court 
against Austria: in most of the cases it was bad execution of EU law 
by federal agencies which caused these legal proceedings. Despite the 
results that refute the afore-mentioned assumptions, there are a lot 
of critics who complain about the Austrian federal system in the light 
of European integration.
Matters in which the Länder have lost political influence and 
powers were mainly the regulatory laws on the real estates, envi-
ronmental politics, nature and landscape protection or public con-
tracts.
Since 1995 the federal government only deviated from a uniform 
statement by the Länder in EU matters in three cases. In addition, 
these cases were not very important for regional politics, concerning 
some aspects of animal protection in zoos, information on environ-
mental matters and waste disposal. This fact indicates that there 
haven’t been any serious conflicts between the federal government 
and the Länder in the past with regard to European matters. We can 
also say that there have been no cases in which the Länder have seen 
the EU as an ally against the national government.
4.2. Bureaucracy and Federalism
Austria has still as a “heritage” of the Austrian – Hungarian Em-
pire comparatively wide-ranged bureaucratic staffs in the Federal 
Ministries. Federal execution play also an important role in the Länder: 
There are many federal agencies and authorities in the Länder, for 
example for workers protection, school administration or public se-
curity. Also the whole labour market service is task of federal legisla-
tion and direct federal administration.
This means not only that also administration in Austria is rather 
centralized, but also that federal bureaucracy usually objects to projects 
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of decentralization, in special in respect of transferring more power 
to the Länder and its authorities.
On the other hand there are Land bureaucracies which are usu-
ally not interested in more federalization, because it would need more 
responsibility and accountability of their taken actions. As a result of 
this situation, in which no one is really interested in change, bureauc-
racy in Austria tends to preserve existing institutions and works as an 
obstacle towards far-reaching of reforms of Austrian federalism.
4.3. Attitudes of Austrian Society towards Federalism
In contrast to other federal systems (notably Canada, Switzerland 
or the USA), Austria is usually described as a homogenous society in 
the comparative literature, where there are no permanent ethnic, 
religious or other cleavages on a regional basis.11 The former polariza-
tion between the centre and the states as well as between the states 
has meanwhile given way to folkloristic stereotypes, and due to social 
and economic modernization regional sub-cultures, local life styles 
and milieus have largely eroded.
Because of the federal character of the political system the po-
litical elites at the state level − more so than the economic elites − 
support regional self-government, all the more as the formal compe-
tencies of the Länder are rather weak compared to other federal 
systems. However, their permanent demands to get more competen-
cies is usually not supported by federal politicians, and this holds true 
for the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), 
which claims to be the most federally-oriented of all the major parties, 
as well.
4.4. Structures of the Party System
In Austria, no distinct party systems exist at the state level. With 
three exceptions (1945 in Carinthia, 1954 in Lower Austria and 1969 
11. Jan Erk, “Austria: A Federation without Federalism”, Publius, Volume 34, No. 1 (2004), 
pp.1-20.
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in Vienna), only the state organizations of national parties have won 
seats in the state parliaments (Landtage) so far. A comparative study 
of five federal systems (Australia, Belgium, Germany, Canada and Aus-
tria) came to the conclusion that in Austria the adaptation of sub-
national parties and party systems to the structures of the federal 
system was the least intensive.12
In general, the state party organizations enjoy a relatively large 
organizational autonomy versus their national headquarters. Public 
financing of parties at the state level (if we add together all nine 
states) is even higher than at the national level. In case of government 
participation, the state parties also have access to the administrative 
resources of the state governments.13 The exact degree of autonomy 
of the sub-national units depends on the type of party, though. In the 
more federalized Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, 
ÖVP) intra-party power has been decentralized from 1945 onwards, 
with the state organizations with the highest membership (above all 
Lower Austria with about 40 percent, but also Upper Austria and 
Styria) playing leading roles. In the more centralized Social Demo-
cratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), 
the Viennese party organization, with a long tradition of ruling the 
capital and comprising about 26 percent of the members of the party, 
is the dominant intra-party group. The Freedom Party of Austria (Frei-
heitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) was organized in a decentralized 
way until the 1980s, with the organizations of Upper Austria, Carinthia 
and Styria being most powerful. After Jörg Haider had been elected 
party chairman in 1986, however, the state party organizations lost 
influence dramatically. In the Green party, it is the parliamentary fac-
tion which dominates intra-party decision-making, but especially the 
Viennese party organization has to be taken into account (in 2003, 
e.g., it was able to stifle the rather promising coalition negotiations 
with the ÖVP).
The party systems at the national and state level form joint are-
nas. The ‘national’ trend in voter attitudes since the mid-1980s, char-
12. See nearer Peter Bußjäger/Franz Fallend, Country Report Austria, Project of Bertelsmann 
Foundation “Optimizing multi-level-Governance. Publication in preparation for 2010 by 
Bertelsmann Foundation. 
13. Franz Fallend, “Bund-Länder-Beziehungen ”. In Herbert Dachs (ed.) Politik in Österreich: 
Das Handbuch, Vienna, Manz Verlag, 2006, p. 1036.
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acterized by rising political disaffection and protest against the ‘col-
lusion’ and corruption of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government (between 
1987 and 2000), affected the states, too. Similar to the federal level, 
the former two-party systems in the Länder were transformed into 
multi-party systems. However, there still exist distinct voting patterns 
at the state level. At present, in four Länder, the ÖVP dominates 
(Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg), in four the SPÖ (Vi-
enna, Burgenland, Salzburg, Styria), and in one (Carinthia) the FPÖ.
In the Länder of Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper 
Austria and Styria, the governments are composed according to the 
Proporz principle, i.e., they are not based on free majority-building 
in parliament.
Office-holding in the states is rather popular, which is indicated 
by the rather low percentage of members of state governments who 
move up into the federal government. In the period between 1945 
and 1987 only 14 percent of federal government members were re-
cruited from state governments. In 2008 for example the Federal Min-
ister for internal affairs Günther Platter resigned from this function 
to take over the office as Land Governor of Tyrol.
4.5. Constitutional Autonomy of the Länder
Articles 10-15 of the Federal Constitution regulate the separation 
of legislative and executive powers between the Federation and the 
members. Because Federal and Länder statutes have the same rank, 
if one legislature enacts a statute that contradicts the constitutional 
distribution of powers, it remains valid until annulled by the Consti-
tutional Court. In terms of the distribution of powers, four possibilities 
exist: (1) exclusive Bund (Federal) legislation and execution, (2) Bund 
legislation and Länder execution, (3) fundamental legislation by the 
Bund, with enabling legislation and execution by the Länder, and (4) 
exclusive Länder legislation and execution. Although the Länder enjoy 
residual powers in areas not expressly assigned to the Federation, the 
latter exercises the most important powers as enumerated in article 
10 of the Constitution.
Because constitutional autonomy is one of the central elements 
of the Federal principle, each of the nine Länder has its own constitu-
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tion. Yet although the nine Länder have their own legal systems and 
enjoy relative constitutional autonomy, this autonomy is of course 
limited by the powers of the Federal government. In addition, there 
is some pressure toward homogeneity among the Länder constitutions, 
because they are supposed to harmonize with the Federal Constitu-
tion and commonalities among the Länder constitutions facilitate such 
harmonization.
Since the early 1980’s, after a long period of inactivity, various 
reforms of the Länder constitutions have been introduced. Reform 
efforts began with deep reaching changes in the constitution of Vo-
rarlberg in 1984 and with debates about constitutional reform in Sty-
ria at the same time. Other Länder, including Tyrol, Salzburg, and 
Upper Austria, followed within 15 years with important modifications 
of their constitutions. But also in the other Länder various moderniza-
tions of the Länder constitutions took place. These amendments have 
included the establishment of more mechanisms for direct democracy, 
the introduction of goals for state activity, and an expansion of the 
range of instruments, such as public auditing, for supervision of the 
operation of government. Some observers14 have also noted a “wider 
self-consciousness” among the Länder to make use of the constitu-
tional space available to them. Coinciding with this was a change in 
the common understanding of the role of Länder constitutions among 
legal scholars and practitioners. Länder constitutions were no longer 
seen as subservient to the Federal Constitution but instead seen as 
the basic law within the various Länder. This changed understanding, 
however, raised a new question about the scope of constitutional 
autonomy for the Länder.
According to Art. 99 B-VG, the Länder constitutions may not 
“affect” the Federal Constitution. This provision safeguards homoge-
neity between Federal and Land constitutional law. In the past, there 
was extensive debate about the meaning of this provision. However, 
14. Friedrich Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Länder , Vienna, 1988, p. 23; 
Joseph Marko/Klaus Poier, Die Verfassungssysteme der Bundesländer: Institutionen und 
Verfahren repräsentativer und direkter Demokratie, in : Dachs (ed.), Politik in Österreich. 
Das Handbuch, Vienna, Manz Verlag, 2006, p. 943-958. Richard Novak, Die relative Ver-
fassungsautonomie der Länder, in: Rack (ed.), Landesverfassungsreform (1982), pp. 35-49; 
Peter Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, Wien, Verlag Österreich, 2004, pp. 
459-482.
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the Constitutional Court has clarified matters, for many years ruling 
that “affect” means that subnational constitutions may not contradict 
the Federal Constitution.15 This means that the constitutional auton-
omy of the Länder resulting from Art. 15 para. 1 B-VG, in that all 
competencies in legislation or administration that are not explicitly 
transferred to the federation remain within the autonomous field of 
the Länder, has its limits in the fundamental principles of the Federal 
constitution on the one hand and in explicit provisions of the Federal 
Constitution on the other. This implies that the Länder constitutions 
may codify anything insofar as it does not contradict Federal consti-
tutional law.
The Federal Constitution provides a general framework that is 
applicable to both the Federation and the nine Länder. This framework 
is not only based on the fundamental constitutional principles such 
as democracy, republicanism, the rule of law, and human rights, but 
also on certain constitutional provisions of a more general character, 
such as the duties of administrative bodies or the structure of state 
organization.16 Therefore scholars have characterized the constitu-
tional autonomy of the Austrian Länder as a “relative constitutional 
autonomy.” Consequently, Art. 99 B-VG serves as a specific rule for 
the homogeneous relationship between Federal and Länder constitu-
tional law.17 On ground of this rule a certain standard of fundamental 
rights or democratic instruments is guaranteed.
The Austrian Federal Constitution – unlike those in Germany, 
Switzerland, and the United States, for example – regulates in detail 
the structure and operation of subnational governments. Art. 95 B-VG 
mandates the same principles for state parliamentary elections as for 
elections on the Federal level (principles of common, equal, secret, 
and direct elections). Art. 96 B-VG states that the status of the depu-
ties of the Landtage may not deviate from the status of the deputies 
to the National Council. Other provisions prescribe legislative proce-
dure in the Länder (e.g., Art. 97 B-VG).
15. See VfSlg 5676/1968; 9547/1982.
16. See also Anna Gamper, “The Principle of Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian 
Federalism: The Constitutional Court´s Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg”, in: 
Peter Bußjäger/Anna Gamper (eds.), The homogeneity of Democracy, Rights and the Rule 
of Law in Federal or Confederal Systems, Vienna, Braumüller Verlag, 2003, p. 126.
17. Gamper, Principle, 2003, p. 134.
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Art. 101 B-VG requires that the Land government has to be 
elected by the Land parliament and consist of a governor, his rep-
resentatives, and other members. The Federal Constitution also con-
tains special regulations for the capital Vienna, due to its dual sta-
tus as state and municipality, as well as detailed regulations for the 
institutional structure and operation of municipalities. According 
to Art. 117 B-VG, there must be a municipal council that is elected 
on the basis of proportional representation, a mayor who may – 
depending on the respective Land constitution – be elected direct-
ly by the people, and an executive body, the Gemeindevorstand. 
The Federal Constitution authorizes the Länder to allow munici-
palities to make use of direct democracy, such as initiatives and 
referenda, to the municipal level. Art. 118 par. 2 B-VG includes a 
definition of local self-government along the lines of the subsidiary 
principle. Par. 3 enumerates those matters for which local self-gov-
ernment is guaranteed.
Austria’s subnational constitutions are quite uniform in their 
regulation of the structure of Land governments and the procedures 
by which they operate. This is hardly surprising, because these provi-
sions largely predate the recent reforms of Länder constitutions dis-
cussed above. There are no bicameral systems on the Länder level, 
and the election of the Landtage is based on the same electoral prin-
ciples as the election of the National Council (Art. 95 B-VG). The 
Federal Constitution basically determines the selection, composition, 
and role of the Länder parliaments, but the Länder constitutions sup-
ply detailed provisions for the selection and composition of the leg-
islature that supplement those found in the Federal Constitution. 
Länder constitutions also regulate the internal structures of the Länder 
parliaments, i.e. party factions, standing committees, and instruments 
of political and financial control of the executive (e.g., the right of 
interpellation, the appointment of investigative committees, and 
the vote of no-confidence, as well as audit offices of the Länder). 
Because of its obvious political importance, Länder constitutions ad-
dress in great detail the election of the government by the Land 
parliament. Länder constitutions also provide for various instruments 
of direct democracy, and they regulate the use of “authorizations” of 
the Federal Constitution. For instance, one-third of the deputies 
of a state parliament may request judicial review of Land legislation 
before the Constitutional Court (Art. 140 para. 1 und 3 B-VG). Fur-
thermore, Land parliaments have to be informed on all EU matters 
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that fall into the competence of the Länder and have the right to 
adopt binding opinions on those matters. The constitutions also re-
peat provisions of the Federal Constitution, such as the right to con-
clude international treaties.18
The most important differences as far as governmental structures 
are concerned are the rules on the composition of the executive body, 
the state government. After 1945, seven of the nine Länder constitu-
tions – all but those of Vorarlberg and Vienna – provided for propor-
tional representation. These constitutions were based on a power-
sharing model under which the political parties – in particular the 
conservative People´s Party, the Social Democratic Party, the national-
liberal Freedom Party, and the Greens – could appoint members of 
the government based on their share of the popular vote. Moreover, 
in Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, and Styria, 
the parties secured the right that only the candidates nominated by 
them are elected insofar as only they have the right for nomination 
and only those votes cast are valid that are cast for their nominees 
(the so-called “Fraktionswahl”). This mechanism, which in practice has 
transformed the election into an appointment process for the various 
parties, has nonetheless been accepted by the Constitutional Court 
(VfSlg 12.229/1989). An important element of competition does remain 
in the election of the governor which is, under all Länder constitutions, 
based on a majority vote.
Like Vienna in 1921 and Vorarlberg in 1923, Salzburg and Tyrol 
modified their constitutions at the end of the 1990s in order to ac-
commodate the election of their state governments by a majority 
rather than a proportional voting system. Thus, since 1998 there are 
four Länder with majority governments: Vorarlberg (since 1923), Vi-
enna (since 1921), Salzburg and Tyrol. These reforms were meant to 
spur political competition, but it is debatable whether this goal was 
actually achieved. This might be why other Länder have thus far re-
tained their systems of proportional representation.
This survey of constitutional developments in the Austrian 
Federal system has demonstrated the increasing importance of 
18. See also Joseph Marko, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutionalism, and the Protection 
of Minorities, at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/marko.pdf.
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Länder constitutions. While these constitutions only played a minor 
role for many years, this began to change in the early 1980s, with 
the recognition that Länder constitutions could be venues for in-
novation and policy or institutional experimentation. The effects 
of changes in Länder constitutions have been felt within the borders 
of the various Länder, beyond the borders of individual Länder as 
innovation in one Länd has encouraged emulation and experiment 
through the processes of horizontal federalism, and – to some ex-
tent – even at the Federal level. For example, the decision to low-
er the voting age to 16, whereby nearly every citizen has the right 
to vote in all elections and referenda on the Federal, Land or mu-
nicipal level, was enshrined in the Federal constitution as a result 
of learning from experiments undertaken in various Länder since 
the 1990s.
However, reforms on the Länder level should not be overesti-
mated. The Federation still plays the dominant role in the Austrian 
political system, and the Federal constitution’s restrictions on state 
constitutional space do not allow for deep-rooted reforms such as the 
change from proportional to majority voting in elections to Länder 
parliaments. To sum up, in recent decades reform has proceeded at 
the Länder level on a step-by-step basis, while at the Federal level 
efforts at constitutional reform have failed. One reason is that the 
Federal reform projects are very general and aim to realize deep struc-
tural changes in the Federal system. Another reason is the fact that 
Austria is what Jan Erk has called “a Federation without federalism”.19 
The Austrian citizens want to have both strong regional entities and 
a uniform legal system. While the first is an essential element of fed-
eralism, the latter is incompatible with the concept of federalism. As 
long as Austrian politics and society are unable to overcome this par-
adox, all deep reaching reform projects are likely to fail. Only reform 
projects in specific matters, such as administration of education or 
administrative courts in the Länder seem to have a certain chance to 
get realized.
19. Jan Erk, “Austria: A Federation without Federalism”, Publius: The Journal of Federal-
ism, Volume 34, No. 1 (2004), pp.1-20.
Peter Bußjäger
34
REAF, núm. 10, abril 2010, p. 11-39
5. Summary: Perspectives of Austrian Federalism
5.1. Capacity to Redress the Territorial Balance
After Austria’s accession to the EU and the failure of the ‘Struc-
tural reform of competencies’ in the years 1993 and 1994 there have 
been no attempts to compensate the Länder for their loss of compe-
tencies. Since then the paradigm has changed. Various competencies 
have been transferred to the federal level, but in turn the Länder have 
not been compensated. None of the Länder was successful in exercis-
ing influence on the federal government.
In the last years there have not been any significant conflicts 
between the Länder and the federal government in EU-matters. The 
procedure for the participation of the Länder in the European decision-
making process works well. In case of conflicts, however, the federal 
government would be in the stronger position for there are no judicial 
procedures for the resolution of such conflicts.
5.2. Capacity to Reconcile Regional Diversity and National 
Coherence
As stated above, the procedure of regional participation in EU 
decision-making works well with the exception of that the possibility 
to send a common representative of the Länder into the debates and 
negotiations in the Council, who would also represent the Republic 
as a whole, has never got effective. There are informal instruments 
of coordination within the executives of the Länder which allow them 
to react in time and to represent the Länder’s position in the working 
groups on the European level (in practice, the Landtage are excluded 
from the decision-making process).
In the ranking of EU law implementation among EU member 
states, Austria is presently occupying an average position. In the past 
Austria was sometimes located at the bottom of the list. Sceptics 
blamed the federal system for Austria’s mediocre implementation 
results. Several analyses of the Institute of Federalism have shown, 
however, that the delay was caused by the federal government and 
not by the Länder. The same is true with respect to judgements by 
the European Court of Justice: in most of the cases it was bad execu-
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tion of EU law by Austrian federal agencies which caused the legal 
proceedings.
5.3. Adaptiveness of the Distribution of Powers
The failure of the structural reform of the federal state in 1994 
has led to a standstill in reforms of Austria’s federal system. In the 
following years, the Länder have only succeeded to improve their 
position with regard to the Pact of Consultation and the Pact of Sta-
bility. In addition, the restrictions concerning the competencies for 
civil servants of the Länder and the municipalities were lifted in 1999, 
paving the way for bureaucratic reform in the Länder. The leaders of 
the reform endeavors have been the states of Vorarlberg and Upper 
Austria.
On the other side, the Länder lost their legislative competencies 
for contracting law for public mandates in 2002 and for animal pro-
tection (with the exception of hunting and fishing) in 2004. The fed-
eral government argued that these matters had been heavily Europe-
anized and therefore needed to be transferred to the national level. 
However, the federal laws that have been passed ever since do not 
seem to be more efficient.
5.4. Reform of Financial Responsibilities
In summary the professionals are in the opinion that the Finan-
cial Constitution and the Fiscal Equalisation between Federation, 
Länder and Municipalities needs a bottom-up reform. The main reasons 
are that the existing rules got quite complex in the course of time. 
The primary goal of the current Fiscal Equalisation is the distribution 
and not the optimal allocation.
The Länder are reliant on the transfer payments of the federal 
level, but it would be better to place the responsibility to the Länder. 
Fiscal federalism could be an option, but this would need a far-reach-
ing reform of the financial constitution bringing more autonomy for 
the Land jurisdictions and more differences into Austrian federalism. 
Until now there we cannot recognize any real drive for reforms in this 
direction.
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5.5. Empowerment of Landtage
The Landtage are obliged to implement European law into the 
legal systems of the Länder. Their autonomy is strictly limited in case 
the framework setting of the EU is very narrow. In addition, the Land-
tage have no capacity to emancipate themselves from the dominance 
of the executives thus turning law-making of the parliaments into an 
exclusively procedural act. In case EU regulations, which are directly 
binding on the member states, conflict with the legal systems of the 
states, the law is basically changed without the participation of the 
state parliaments.
Although the Landtage have established specialised committees 
for European matters these committees and even the state parliaments 
were not able to gain influence with regard to European matters. This 
is also true for those states in which the government is obliged to 
inform the Landtag about European matters (Burgenland, Upper Aus-
tria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol and Vorarlberg). This is because the state 
parliaments do not dispose of financial and human resources in order 
to compete with the state executives.
In this context it is interesting to note that there is neither an 
institutional nor an informal connection between the state parliaments 
(or the state governments) and the Federal Council with regard to 
European matters. In contrast to the National Council the Federal 
Council cannot submit binding statements to the federal government 
and can therefore be ruled out as cooperation partner of the states.
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ABSTRACT
The following article describes current challenges of Austrian federalism. On 
ground of the Federal Constitution from 1920 Austria is a federation with 
nine autonomous Länder. Federalism is one of the basic principles of the 
constitution. Nevertheless the Länder are faced with centralizing drive due 
to Europeanization and unitarism. On the other hand the Länder have a 
strong regional identity. The Länder are emotionally deeply rooted in the 
Austrian population. The Länder also participate well in the decision making 
process on European level.
Nevertheless the division of competencies both in legislation and administra-
tion between Federation and Länder is complicated and needs to be mod-
ernised. In the past various reform projects on federal level had failed while 
various reforms in the Land constitutions have led to more innovation on 
Land level. Despite these facts paradigms of reform debates on Austria´s 
federal system have changed: Until the early nineties of 20th century consti-
tutional reforms aimed to strengthen the role of the Länder. Since Austria´s 
accession to the EU reform projects the efficiency of the federal structures 
of Austria are doubted. Economical and financial crisis probably will increase 
the pressure for structural reforms.
Key words: Europeanization; Federal Constitution; constitutional autonomy; 
financial constitution; National Council; Federal Council; Landtage; Munici-
palities.
RESUM
Aquest article descriu els problemes actuals del federalisme a Àustria. D’acord 
amb la Constitució federal de 1920, Àustria és una federació amb nou Länder 
(comunitats autònomes), i el federalisme és un dels principis bàsics d’aquesta 
constitució. Tanmateix, els Länder afronten ara tendències centralitzadores, 
a causa de l’europeïtzació i l’unitarisme. D’altra banda, tenen una forta iden-
titat regional i estan sentimentalment molt arrelats en la població austríaca. 
A més, és important la participació dels Länder en el procés de presa de 
decisions en l’àmbit europeu.
Tot i això, la divisió de competències entre la federació i els Länder quant a 
legislació i administració és complicada i cal que es modernitzi. En el passat, 
hi ha hagut diversos projectes de reformes en l’àmbit federal que han fra-
cassat, mentre que diverses reformes en les constitucions dels Länder han 
dut més innovacions en el marc dels mateixos. Tanmateix, els paradigmes del 
debat de reforma del sistema federal austríac han canviat: fins a principis de 
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la dècada dels noranta del segle XX, les reformes constitucionals pretenien 
reforçar el paper dels Länder; des de l’entrada d’Àustria als projectes de re-
forma de la UE, es posa en dubte l’eficàcia de les estructures federals austría-
ques. Segurament, la crisi econòmica i financera augmentarà la pressió per 
endegar reformes estructurals.
Paraules clau: europeïtzació; constitució federal; autonomia constitucional; 
constitució financera, consell nacional; consell federal; parlaments autonòmics 
(Landtage), municipis.
REsUmEn
El presente artículo describe las dificultades actuales del federalismo en Aus-
tria. De acuerdo con la Constitución Federal de 1920, Austria es una federa-
ción de nueve Länder (comunidades autónomas), y el federalismo es uno de 
los principios básicos de esta constitución. Sin embargo, los Länder afrontan 
ahora tendencias hacia el centralismo, a causa de la europeización y el uni-
tarismo. Asimismo, los Länder representan una fuerte identidad regional y 
están muy arraigados sentimentalmente en la población austríaca. Además, 
tienen un papel importante en la toma de decisiones en el ámbito europeo.
No obstante, la división de competencias entre la federación y los Länder en 
lo referente a la legislación y la administración es complicada y necesita ser 
modernizada. En el pasado, han fracasado varios proyectos de reforma en 
el ámbito federal, mientras que varias reformas en las constituciones de los 
Länder han propulsado más innovaciones en el marco de los propios Länder. 
Sin embargo, los paradigmas de los debates de reforma en el sistema federal 
austríaco han cambiado: hasta principios de los años noventa del siglo xx, las 
reformas constitucionales pretendían reforzar el papel de los Länder; desde 
la entrada de Austria en los proyectos de reforma de la UE, se duda de la 
eficacia de estas estructuras federales austríacas. Asimismo, la crisis econó-
mica y financiera probablemente aumentará la presión para reformas estruc-
turales. 
Palabras clave: europeización, constitución federal, autonomía constitucional, 
constitución financiera, consejo nacional, consejo federal, parlamento auto-
nómico (Landtage), municipios. 
